

ADAPTIVE POLICING IN ASYMMETRIC CONFLICT: LESSONS FROM MOBILE BRIGADE REGIMENT II IN NDUGA REGENCY, PAPUA, 2018–2025

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INFO ARTIKEL	ABSTRAK
<i>Sejarah Artikel: (Diisi Editor)</i> Diterima: 15 Maret 2026 Direvisi: 27 Maret 2026 Disetujui: 28 Juni 2026 Tersedia Daring: 11 Juli 2026 Kata Kunci: <i>Penegakan Hukum Adaptif; Konflik Asimetris; Model Penegakan Hukum; Modern</i>	Kelompok Kriminal Bersenjata (KKB) di Kabupaten Nduga, Provinsi Papua Tengah, menjadi tantangan keamanan dalam negeri yang kompleks akibat karakteristik konflik asimetris, kondisi geografis yang sulit, keterbatasan komunikasi, hambatan logistik, dan dinamika sosial masyarakat lokal. Penelitian ini bertujuan untuk mengevaluasi penerapan strategi preventif, represif, dan intelijen dalam penanganan KKB selama periode 2018–2025 serta merumuskan model kepolisian adaptif yang sesuai dengan konteks konflik asimetris. Penelitian ini menggunakan pendekatan kualitatif dengan mengacu pada teori Sistem Adaptif Kompleks, Kepolisian Berbasis Intelijen, konsep Perencanaan, Pengorganisasian, Pelaksanaan, dan Pengendalian (POAC), serta Kepolisian Berorientasi Masyarakat. Data diperoleh melalui wawancara, studi dokumen internal kepolisian, dan analisis data sekunder. Hasil penelitian menunjukkan bahwa penanganan KKB memerlukan integrasi strategi preemtif, preventif, represif, dan intelijen melalui penguatan intelijen manusia (Human Intelligence/HUMINT) yang berkelanjutan. Pendekatan represif diperlukan untuk menghadapi eskalasi ancaman bersenjata, namun perlu diseimbangkan dengan strategi pencegahan dan keterlibatan masyarakat agar tidak memperlebar jarak sosial. Efektivitas penanganan dipengaruhi oleh faktor geografis, komunikasi, logistik, organisasi, kualitas personel, serta dukungan pemerintah daerah dan tokoh lokal. Penelitian ini menghasilkan model kepolisian adaptif yang menekankan fleksibilitas respons, integrasi fungsi intelijen dan operasional, pemanfaatan teknologi, penguatan sumber daya manusia, koordinasi lintas sektor, dan evaluasi berkelanjutan untuk mewujudkan kehadiran negara yang efektif dan humanis.

ABSTRACT
Keywords: <i>Adaptive Policing; Asymmetric Conflict; Modern Policing Model</i> <i>The Armed Criminal Group (Kelompok Kriminal Bersenjata/KKB) in Nduga Regency, Central Papua Province, has become a complex domestic security challenge due to the characteristics of asymmetric conflict, difficult geographical conditions, communication limitations, logistical barriers, and the social dynamics of the local community. This research aims to evaluate the implementation of preventive, repressive, and intelligence strategies in handling KKB during the 2018–2025 period and to formulate an adaptive policing model suited to the context of asymmetric conflict. This research uses a qualitative approach referring to Complex Adaptive Systems theory, Intelligence-Led Policing, the concept of Planning, Organizing, Actuating, and Controlling (POAC), and Community-Oriented Policing. Data were obtained through interviews, study of internal police documents, and secondary data analysis. The results of the research show that handling KKB requires the integration of preemptive, preventive, repressive, and intelligence strategies through the sustained</i>

strengthening of Human Intelligence (HUMINT). A repressive approach is needed to deal with the escalation of armed threats, but it needs to be balanced with prevention strategies and community engagement so as not to widen the social distance. The effectiveness of handling is influenced by geographical factors, communication, logistics, organization, personnel quality, as well as support from local government and local figures. This research produces an adaptive policing model that emphasizes response flexibility, integration of intelligence and operational functions, utilization of technology, strengthening of human resources, cross-sector coordination, and continuous evaluation in order to realize an effective and humanistic state presence.

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1. Introduction

Armed conflicts involving the Armed Criminal Group (*Kelompok Kriminal Bersenjata/KKB*), especially in the mountainous region of Papua, have experienced an escalation in recent years. The internal security challenges unfold in a complex and sustained manner, and should not only be understood as an ordinary crime problem, since this condition has developed into a form of armed violence with simultaneous political, social, geographical, and security dimensions. In various events, the KKBs carried out attacks on security forces, public facilities, transportation facilities, and civil society. These conditions disrupt security stability, community socio-economic activities, public services, and the legitimacy of the state's presence in conflict areas (Siagian et al., 2025).

In the context of internal security, the police are in a complex position when dealing with non-state armed groups. On the one hand, the police have a mandate to maintain public security and order, enforce the law, and provide protection and services to the community (Hadi et al., 2025). On the other hand, the escalation of armed threats demands tactical readiness, rapid response capabilities, intelligence support, interunit coordination, and organizational adaptability. Kraska (2007) explains that in certain situations, the police can be forced into an operating room that is close to a military character, especially when facing a high-intensity armed threat. This condition raises an operational dilemma because excessive use of force can cause social distancing from the community, while a response that is too weak can increase the movement space of armed groups.

Data shows the dynamics of armed conflicts in Nduga Regency for the 2018–2025 period show that security disturbances occur in various forms, including shooting contacts, post attacks, shooting disturbances, shooting at the community, aircraft shootings, helicopter shootings, hostage-taking, destruction of state facilities, hijackings, threats, and tribal wars. The data also shows that there are victims from elements of the armed forces/police, immigrant communities, and indigenous Papuans. This pattern illustrates that conflicts in Nduga Regency are volatile, complex, and continuous, so they

require a police operating model that can adapt its approach to the evolving escalation of threats on the ground.

Given the security conditions, security operations require a balance in law enforcement. When the armed threat is at a high level of escalation and requires a rapid response to protect security forces and civil society against perpetrators of armed violence, and necessary to restrict the movement of armed groups, arrests of perpetrators, and confiscation of weapons used in various acts of violence, the repressive act is necessary. However, when there is no threat is detected, security operations should take the form of social communication, community mobilization, and strengthening the legitimacy of the state apparatus to maintain order and security. In practice, the handling of KKBs in Papua has changed to a more peace-building approach.

Nevertheless, preventive approaches also have limitations when applied to areas with active armed threats. Social activities, humanitarian assistance, and community development can strengthen public trust. However, they are not always sufficient to suppress security threats without strong law enforcement and intelligence. Conversely, a repressive approach can produce short-term operational impacts, but it is not necessarily capable of producing long-term stability if it is not integrated with preventive and intelligence strategies.

Various previous studies show that the effectiveness of police operations in conflict areas is determined not only by law enforcement capability, but also by organizational capability in integrating repressive, preventive, intelligence, and community partnership approaches. Research by Siagian et al. (2025) shows that handling the conflict of armed criminal groups in Papua requires synergy between law enforcement actions and community empowerment to prevent the regeneration of armed groups. From an operational perspective, Ratcliffe (2016) asserts that Intelligence-Led Policing improves operational effectiveness through the use of intelligence as a basis for decision-making (Atherley, 2025). Study by Patiran et al. (2022) shows that security operations in Papua require a balance between law enforcement actions, humanitarian approaches, intelligence functions, and public communication. Putra and Prianggono (2022) emphasize the importance of leadership and organizational culture in supporting the performance of Mobile Brigade (*Brimob*) personnel, while Kendek and Silo (2024) highlight the role of community policing, community empowerment, and governance in the implementation of police policy in Papua. From a legal perspective, Rohman et al. (2024) examine the role of the Mobile Brigade Corps (*Korps Brimob*) in handling armed conflict based on statutory regulations. Meanwhile, international research by Eck (2025), Panwar and Roy (2025), as well as Nte and Nte (2025) discusses policing models in conflict areas, the dilemma between security and human rights, and the importance of utilizing intelligence to support operational decision-making. These findings show that the effectiveness of police operations is influenced by organizational aspects, operational strategy, legitimacy, and intelligence support in facing the dynamics of conflict.

Nevertheless, these various studies generally still discuss repressive, preventive, and intelligence approaches, organizational adaptation, and community policing partially, so that they have not yet produced an integrated police operation management

framework for facing complex non-state armed conflict. In addition, studies that specifically analyze the operational management of Mobile Brigade Regiment II (*Resimen II Pasukan Pelopor*) in handling the conflict of armed criminal groups in Nduga Regency are also still very limited, particularly those integrating the functions of Planning, Organizing, Actuating, and Controlling (POAC) with preventive, repressive, and intelligence approaches into a single adaptive operational model. Based on this gap, this research offers novelty in the form of the formulation of an Adaptive Policing Model that integrates the perspectives of Complex Adaptive Systems, Intelligence-Led Policing, Community-Oriented Policing, and POAC functions as a comprehensive police operation management framework for handling asymmetric conflict. Through this model, this research not only evaluates the effectiveness of each approach, but also explains the relationships between operation management components in improving the effectiveness of handling non-state armed conflict. Therefore, this research aims to evaluate the implementation of preventive, repressive, and intelligence approaches in handling the conflict of armed criminal groups in Nduga Regency during the 2018–2025 period, to analyze the factors influencing their implementation, and to formulate an adaptive policing model that is effective in the context of asymmetric conflict.

This study draws on the theory of Complex Adaptive Systems to understand police operations as a system comprising various actors, resources, command structures, information, social environments, and interacting regional conditions. The application of adaptive policing places greater emphasis on organizational learning, flexibility, and continuous adaptation to a constantly changing threat environment, rather than relying solely on rigid operational procedures (Bayley, 1990). This theory views the organization as a system that must learn, adapt, and improve its responses to changes in the environment (Holland, 1992). In the context of Nduga, police operations cannot be understood as a linear process that moves only from planning to implementation, but as a dynamic process influenced by armed threats, terrain conditions, community response, intelligence quality, logistics availability, cross-sector coordination, and continuous evaluation.

In addition, this study draws on the theory of Intelligence-Led Policing, as the effectiveness of operations in conflict areas is highly dependent on the quality of information and intelligence analysis. Ratcliffe (2016) explains that Intelligence-Led Policing places intelligence information and analysis as the basis for determining operational priorities, resource allocation, and decision-making. In the context of Nduga Regency, intelligence serves not only to detect the movements of armed groups but also to monitor social networks, identify potential escalations, support preventive approaches, and prevent misactions that could cause social resistance.

This study also uses the Planning, Organizing, Actuating, and Controlling (POAC) framework to analyze operational management. Planning is necessary to map threats, define operational objectives, prepare resources, and draft action scenarios. Organizing involves the division of tasks, command structure, coordination among units, and the arrangement of operational resources. Actuating involves the implementation of strategy, the deployment of personnel, command communication, and tactical actions in

the field. Controlling is necessary to supervise, evaluate, and improve the implementation of operations to ensure alignment with objectives. In conflict areas such as Nduga, POACs must be run flexibly because the security situation can change quickly and is often unpredictable.

The concept of Community-Oriented Policing is also relevant because the success of conflict management depends not only on the ability to enforce it, but also on the ability to build relationships with the community. Community-Oriented Policing emphasizes partnership between police and the community, building trust, joint problem-solving, and community participation in maintaining security. This approach is in line with the view of Trojanowicz and Bucqueroux (1990), who argue that community-based policing is founded on partnership, problem-solving, and community participation in maintaining public security. Similarly, Skogan (2006) emphasizes that cooperation and trust between the police and the community strengthen the effectiveness and legitimacy of police activities.

In conflict areas, this approach is important because community support can affect the flow of information, the effectiveness of early warnings, the legitimacy of police actions, and the sustainability of security and stability. However, its implementation in Nduga Regency must take into account the local social structure, the roles of traditional and religious leaders, local governments, and the security risks faced by the community. Community-oriented policing also contributes to strengthening police legitimacy because sustained engagement with the local community increases procedural justice, public trust, and voluntary cooperation with police institutions (Tyler, 2006).

Various previous studies have discussed policing in conflict areas, the risks of police militarization, the importance of police legitimacy, the role of intelligence in operational decision-making, and community-based policing approaches. However, there is still room for study that has not been widely explained, namely, the formulation of adaptive policing models specifically designed for police operation management in the context of asymmetric conflicts. Existing studies tend to discuss repressive, preventive, and intelligence approaches separately, even though handling KKB conflicts in Nduga Regency requires a model that integrates these three approaches into a single operating framework.

Based on these gaps, this article aims to evaluate the application of preventive, repressive, and intelligence approaches in handling KKB conflicts in Nduga Regency for the 2018–2025 period; analyze the factors influencing the application of the three approaches in security operations; and formulate an effective adaptive policing model in the context of asymmetric conflicts in Nduga Regency. Through this goal, this article is expected to contribute to the development of police science studies, especially in the formulation of operating models that integrate law enforcement capacity, preventive strategies, intelligence support, organizational adaptation, and community-based policing in complex conflict areas.

Armed groups can exploit geographic conditions, social networks, local mobility, and limitations in the country's infrastructure to carry out attacks or evade detection by security forces. Bayley (1994) explained that police institutions must be organizationally

adaptable to respond to changes in the community's character, threats, and social conditions. In this context, rigid, static operating models are insufficient to address the rapidly evolving dynamics of conflict. The need for a policing model that is not partial but integrated into a single adaptive operating system to handle KKBs is deemed necessary in an asymmetrical situation characterized by differences in capacity, resources, structure, and patterns of action between state and non-state actors.

2. Method

This research uses a qualitative approach that aims to understand in depth the implementation of preventive, repressive, and intelligence approaches in the operational management of Mobile Brigade Battalion II (*Batalyon II Pasukan Pelopor*) in handling the Armed Criminal Group (*Kelompok Kriminal Bersenjata/KKB*) in Nduga Regency during the 2018–2025 period, based on the process, experience, operational dynamics, organizational constraints, and the formulation of an adaptive policing model in the context of asymmetric conflict. This research adopts a qualitative case study design, as it allows an in-depth investigation of contemporary phenomena within a real-life context (Yin, 2018). This case study focuses on the operational management of Mobile Brigade Regiment II (*Resimen Pasukan Perintis II*) in handling the Armed Criminal Group (KKB) in Nduga Regency, thereby enabling the researcher to comprehensively examine organizational processes, operational decision-making, interactions among stakeholders, and contextual factors influencing the implementation of preventive, repressive, and intelligence approaches.

The primary and secondary data from the research locus are based on security operations in Nduga Regency, Highland Papua Province. The variance of internal police documents, police operational documents, intelligence reports, organizational documents, security incident data, regulations, scientific literature, and publications relevant to the KKBs is used to reinforce, verify, and give context to the primary data obtained through key informant interviews to purposively selected informants who have the operational experience and capacity in explaining the dynamics of operations management, the application of repressive, preventive, and intelligence approaches, as well as the obstacles faced in the field. The interviews were directed to explore empirical experiences, subjective assessments, operational considerations, and informants' views on the need for a more adaptive operating model. Observation is used to understand situations, coordination patterns, and operational practices related to operations management. This variety creates understanding normative frameworks, policy patterns, organizational structures, and factual dynamics that do not always appear completely in interviews (Creswell & Poth, 2018; Yin, 2018).

This research involved 11 informants selected purposively and representing various stakeholder groups, including the Commander of Mobile Brigade Regiment II (*Resimen Pasukan Perintis II*), operational officers, operational non-commissioned officers, police personnel, Indonesian National Armed Forces (TNI) personnel assigned in Nduga Regency, community representatives consisting of local residents, community figures, women, youth representatives, and Trans Papua drivers, as well as legal experts. Informants were selected based on their direct involvement in security operations,

operational experience in Nduga Regency, knowledge of policing strategies and conflict dynamics, and their willingness to participate in this research. Data collection was conducted May 2026.

Semi-structured interviews were conducted using an interview guide developed based on the research questions and theoretical framework. Interviews were conducted either face to face or through secure communication media, depending on field accessibility and security conditions. Before each interview, participants were given an explanation of the research objectives, the voluntary nature of their participation, and their right to withdraw at any time without any consequences. Informed consent was obtained before data collection began. With the permission of the participants, interviews were recorded in audio form and then transcribed verbatim for analysis. To ensure confidentiality, all participants were anonymized using identification codes, and all interview recordings, transcripts, and supporting documents were stored securely in password-protected digital files accessible only to the researcher.

The data obtained is not only descriptive but also capable of explaining the relationship among field facts, theoretical frameworks, and model formulation. Data analysis was carried out using the interactive qualitative analysis model of Miles et al. (2014). At the data collection stage, the researcher collects information from interviews, observations, and document studies (Miles et al., 2014). At the data condensation stage, the information obtained was selected, simplified, categorized, and directed according to the three main focuses of the research, namely the evaluation of the preventive-repressive-intelligence approach, the factors that affect the application of the approach, and the formulation of the adaptive policing model. At the data presentation stage, the findings are systematically compiled as thematic descriptions so that the relationships between categories are clearly visible. At the conclusion of the drawing stage, findings are repeatedly verified through comparison among interview data, documents, and theoretical frameworks.

The validity of the data is maintained through source triangulation and triangulation techniques. Source triangulation is done by comparing information from various informants and relevant documents. Technical triangulation was carried out by comparing the results of interviews, observations, and desk reviews. Through this triangulation, this study seeks to ensure that the conclusions produced do not rely solely on one type of data but are built through complementary readings of informant experiences, operating documents, secondary data, and scientific literature.

The selection of the research location was based on the understanding that Nduga Regency is one of the areas that experienced ongoing armed conflict during the period 2018–2025. This area has mountainous terrain, limited transportation access, communication barriers, and community social conditions that demand a different pattern of police operations than in urban areas or areas with low levels of security disturbances. Therefore, Nduga Regency is a relevant locus for assessing the need for adaptive policing in managing police operations in conflict areas.




Figure 1. Research Location

The analytical framework of this study uses the theory of Complex Adaptive Systems and Intelligence-Led Policing, as well as the concepts of Planning, Organizing, Actuating, Controlling (POAC), and Community-Oriented Policing. The Complex Adaptive Systems theory is used to understand the KKB conflict in Nduga Regency as a dynamic, non-linear, and influenced by many actors and environmental factors. Intelligence-Led Policing examines the role of information and intelligence analysis in determining operational priorities, resource allocation, and decision-making. The POAC concept is used to read operations management from the planning, organizing, implementing, to control stages. Meanwhile, Community-Oriented Policing is used to assess the importance of social partnerships, community trust, and local participation in supporting the effectiveness of security operations.

3. Result and Discussion

3.1 Evaluation of preventive, repressive, and intelligence approaches in handling KKB conflicts in Nduga regency

The findings of this study reinforce the relevance of the theory of Complex Adaptive Systems in understanding police operations in conflict areas. The KKB conflict in Nduga Regency cannot be understood as a simple relationship between the security forces and armed groups. The conflict involves the interaction between armed threats, geographical conditions, social structure, infrastructure limitations, intelligence quality, logistics, command structures, and public perception of state apparatus. Each of these elements affects each other and can change the dynamics of operations. Therefore, the operating system needed is one that is capable of learning, adapting, and improving responses based on feedback from the field.

The Intelligence-Led Policing theory also has strong relevance in this research. The findings show that information weaknesses, delays in intelligence distribution, and lack of optimal Human Intelligence can affect the effectiveness of repressive and preventive approaches. In intelligence-based operations, actions should not be based solely on reactions to events, but should be supported by risk analysis, actor mapping, escalation

predictions, and action priorities. Thus, Intelligence-Led Policing becomes a bridge between enforcement capabilities and prevention needs.

The POAC concept helps explain that the operational problem in Nduga is not only in the implementation stage, but also in the entire operation management cycle. Planning is needed to map threats and resource needs. Organizing is needed to ensure that the division of tasks and command structure runs clearly. Actuating is needed to ensure action in the field is in accordance with the objectives of the operation. Controlling is needed to evaluate actions and improve strategies. In the context of asymmetric conflict, POAC cannot be run rigidly, but must be adaptive to changing threats and social conditions.

Meanwhile, Community-Oriented Policing reinforces the legitimacy dimension in adaptive policing models. Conflict management is not enough to only produce security in the sense of the absence of attacks, but also to build a sense of security and public trust. If the public views the apparatus as a protector, then the opportunities for cooperation, information flow, and social stability will be greater. On the other hand, if the public sees the apparatus as a threat, then security operations can lose social support. Therefore, a community-based approach should be an important part of adaptive policing models, especially in conflict areas that have strong social and cultural structures.

Thus, the results of this study show that adaptive policing is not just the ability of the police to react quickly to threats, but the ability of police organizations to integrate actions, information, resources, coordination, and social legitimacy in a single operating system. Adaptive policing demands a balance between assertiveness and social sensitivity, between enforcement and prevention, between technology and Human Intelligence, and between formal command and local partnerships. This is the main contribution of this research to the development of police science studies, especially in the context of operational management in asymmetric conflict areas.

Table 1. Summary of Findings on Preventive, Repressive, and Intelligence Approaches in Handling the KKB Conflict in Nduga Regency

Approach	Key Findings	Operational Implications
Preventive	Patrols, social assistance, social communication, securing community activities, involvement of local figures	Increases the sense of security and builds community trust
Repressive	Action against KKB, arrest of wanted persons (DPO), restriction of the armed group's freedom of movement	Controls the escalation of threats and enforces the law
Intelligence	Threat analysis, actor mapping, early warning, decision-making support	Serves as the basis for planning, priority setting, and operation evaluation

Based on this summary of findings, it can be seen that the three approaches have different operational objectives, but complement one another in the implementation of

security operations. The repressive approach functions to stop ongoing threats, the preventive approach is directed at building social stability and community trust, while the intelligence approach provides information that forms the basis for determining priority actions. Thus, the effectiveness of operations is determined not only by the success of each approach separately, but also by the integration of all three within a single operational cycle.

The results of the study show that preventive, repressive, and intelligence approaches have been used in handling KKB conflicts in Nduga Regency. The three approaches have different functions, but they are interrelated in the implementation of security operations. The repressive approach is directed to respond to the escalation of armed threats, crack down on perpetrators of violence, arrest wanted lists, limit the movement space of armed groups, and stop security disturbances that endanger the authorities and civil society (Eck, 2025). In conditions of intense armed conflict, a repressive approach is still necessary because the state has an obligation to maintain security, protect citizens, and enforce the law against acts of violence.

However, the findings of the study also show that the repressive approach cannot be used as the only main instrument in handling KKB conflicts (Panwar & Roy, 2025). An approach that overemphasizes the use of force has the potential to have social consequences, especially in societies that have kinship, territorial proximity, and complex social relationships. In such conditions, actions of action that are not properly communicated can be perceived negatively by some people. This finding is in line with Kraska's (2007) view that the tendency to militarize in police practice can cause legitimacy problems if not controlled through the principles of proportionality, accountability, and community protection orientation.

"Both the Nemangkawi assignment, which is repressive in nature, and Operation Damai Cartenz, which is more preventive, have their own weaknesses and strengths. Nemangkawi can push back KKB directly and in a coordinated manner, but it creates negative stigma among the community. Meanwhile, the preventive approach can win over the hearts of the community, but the risk to the safety of personnel is also higher. It would be good if the strengths of each operation could be combined and their weaknesses eliminated, so that a more adaptive operational pattern could be devised by combining personnel capability, technology, and intelligence." (AS/INTG-ADP, June 3, 2026)

The preventive approach in security operations in Nduga Regency is carried out through patrols, securing community activities, social communication, social assistance, community development, and the involvement of local figures. This approach plays an important role in building a sense of security, strengthening the relationship between security forces and the community, and reducing social distancing that can arise from enforcement operations. In conflict areas, preventive approaches are meaningful not only as efforts to prevent security disturbances but also as strategies to build the legitimacy of the state's presence. Public trust is important because the community can be a source of information, a partner in early detection, and a party that helps create social stability.

"In my opinion, the security forces already understand quite well the condition of the migrant community. But to handle the indigenous community, a more intensive

approach is needed. Security forces must be able to study the social culture and customs in Nduga, so they know the existing boundaries and habits. For example, on Sundays there should preferably be no patrols or activities visible to the community because that is church worship time. If the security forces can adjust, the situation can be better.” (MP/PREV-SENSBUD, June 2, 2026)

This quotation shows that preventive law enforcement in Nduga must not only focus on maintaining security, but also on understanding local customs, religious practices, and community values. This finding reinforces the principles of Community-Oriented Policing, which emphasizes law enforcement that is culturally responsive and involves continuous engagement with local communities.

However, preventive approaches also have limitations. Social activities and community development are not enough if they are not designed as part of a long-term strategy to build trust and social resilience of the community. Temporary social assistance can help ease tensions, but it does not necessarily change people’s perceptions of the authorities if it is not accompanied by consistent communication, real protection, and the ongoing involvement of local leaders. Thus, a preventive approach should be placed not as an additional activity, but rather as an integral part of operations management.

The intelligence approach is an important element in handling the KKB conflict in Nduga Regency. Intelligence is used to read threat movements, identify potential escalations, map actors, compile state of affairs, and support operational decision-making. In the context of asymmetric conflicts, intelligence information has a strategic role because armed groups tend to take advantage of geographical conditions, social networks, and infrastructure limitations to move flexibly. Ratcliffe (2016) asserts that Intelligence-Led Policing places information and intelligence analysis as the basis for determining priorities, resource allocation, and operational actions.

“Intelligence information has a very large influence on the success of operations. In operations, we have to coordinate frequently with the Law Enforcement Task Force and the Intelligence Task Force in order to formulate capable operational activities. Incoming information must be reviewed because some information is of high quality, but there is also information that cannot necessarily be trusted right away.” (PS/INT-DUKOPS, June 3, 2026)

However, the results of the study also show that the intelligence function still faces a number of obstacles. These obstacles include information delays, information quality that is not always reliable, uneven distribution of information, and not optimal strengthening of Human Intelligence inherent in the implementation unit. In an area like Nduga, Human Intelligence is important because not all information can be obtained through technology. Field information often requires social connections, cultural understanding, communication with local figures, and the ability to read community dynamics. Therefore, intelligence reinforcement is not only related to technology, but also to personnel capacity, social networks, and sensitivity to local contexts.

“For Nduga Regency, repressive, preventive, and intelligence activities in their tactical implementation still often run separately. At certain moments there is indeed an exchange of information, for example when a state official is going to visit or when there is a major target requiring many personnel. But for daily activities, there are still parts that have not been unified, especially in gathering information and searching for weapons, ammunition, or KKB wanted persons (DPO).” (PS/INTG-COORD, June 3, 2026)

Overall, the evaluation of the three approaches shows that the effectiveness of handling KKB conflicts is not sufficiently determined by the existence of separate repressive, preventive, and intelligence approaches. The main problem lies in the level of integration of the three in a single operating cycle. The repressive approach requires intelligence support so that the action is on target. The preventive approach requires intelligence information so that social activities and community communication are not carried out ceremonially. The intelligence approach requires the support of the command structure and field implementers so that information can be transformed into fast and measurable operational decisions. Thus, integration is the key word in building adaptive policing in Nduga Regency.

Table 2. Matrix of the Relationship Between Preventive, Repressive, and Intelligence Approaches in KKB Conflict Handling Operations

Approach	Preventive	Repressive	Intelligence
Preventive	Builds community trust through patrols, social communication, social assistance, and involvement of local figures.	Reduces community resistance to law enforcement actions so that repressive operations are more acceptable.	Provides social information regarding community perception, area conditions, and potential disturbances as input for intelligence analysis.
Repressive	Creates security conditions so that preventive activities can be carried out more safely.	Takes action against perpetrators of violence, arrests wanted persons (DPO), and controls the escalation of threats in accordance with the principle of proportionality.	Produces information from operational results, field findings, and threat developments that become material for updating intelligence products.
Intelligence	Determines the location, target, timing, and form of preventive activities based on threat mapping and the social condition of the community.	Serves as the basis for decision-making in enforcement operations through threat analysis, actor mapping, and early warning.	Processes information continuously through the process of collection, analysis, distribution, and evaluation to support the entire operational cycle.

Table 2 shows that the relationship between the preventive, repressive, and intelligence approaches is interdependent, rather than running separately. The intelligence approach functions as the main connector that provides information for the implementation of both preventive and repressive activities. Conversely, the implementation of preventive and repressive activities produces new information that is then reprocessed through the intelligence function to update the situation analysis and determine the next operational steps. This pattern of reciprocal relationships forms a feedback loop that shows that the effectiveness of handling the KKB conflict is not determined by the dominance of any single approach, but by the organization's ability to integrate all three adaptively within a single operational cycle. This finding reinforces the Complex Adaptive Systems perspective, which views the organization as a system that continuously learns and adjusts its response based on changes in the environment and information obtained from the field.

This finding shows that the relationship between the preventive, repressive, and intelligence approaches does not proceed linearly, but instead forms a system that mutually influences one another. This condition is in line with the Complex Adaptive Systems perspective, which views the organization as an adaptive system that continuously adjusts its strategy based on environmental changes and feedback from the field. In the context of this research, the intelligence approach acts as the main source of information as explained in the concept of Intelligence-Led Policing, while the functions of planning, organizing, actuating, and controlling reflect the implementation of POAC principles in operation management. At the same time, the implementation of the preventive approach through social communication, partnership with community figures, and the building of community trust shows the application of the principle of Community-Oriented Policing. Therefore, the effectiveness of handling the KKB conflict in Nduga Regency is determined not only by the success of each approach separately, but especially by the organization's ability to integrate the three approaches into an adaptive, intelligence-based operational system oriented toward social legitimacy.

3.2 Factors influencing the application of preventive, repressive, and intelligence approaches

The application of preventive, repressive, and intelligence approaches in security operations in Nduga Regency is influenced by a number of interrelated factors. The first factor is the condition of the region. Nduga Regency has a mountainous geographical character, limited transportation access, and a distribution of settlements that are not easy to reach. These conditions affect personnel mobility, logistics distribution, response speed, and the effectiveness of area surveillance. In the context of police operations, difficult terrain is not only a technical obstacle, but also part of the conflict structure because it can be used by armed groups to move, hide, or carry out attacks unexpectedly.

The second factor is the limitation of communication. Unstable communication networks can hinder coordination between units, slow down the distribution of information, and affect the speed of decision-making. In high-intensity security operations, delays in information can have a direct impact on the safety of personnel and

the public. Communication limitations also affect the control function because the operations leader is not always able to get a quick and complete picture of the field. In the perspective of POAC, communication barriers can weaken organizing, actuating, and controlling functions because the execution of operations requires a fast, clear, and trustworthy exchange of information.

The third factor is logistical support. Operations in mountainous and remote areas require more complex logistical support than operations in easily accessible areas. The need for transportation, communication equipment, personnel equipment, health facilities, and mobility support are important elements in maintaining the sustainability of operations. Without adequate logistical support, repressive approaches can lose effectiveness, preventive approaches are difficult to reach the wider community, and intelligence approaches cannot run optimally. Therefore, logistics must be understood as part of the strategy, not just as an administrative affair.

The fourth factor is organization, command, and quality of personnel. Security operations in conflict areas involve various elements, both from the police and other security elements. This condition requires a clear command, a firm division of duties, and a coordination mechanism that is able to avoid overlapping actions in the field. The quality of personnel is also an important factor because operations in conflict areas require tactical skills, physical endurance, mastery of procedures, legal understanding, social communication skills, and sensitivity to local culture. Personnel who are only equipped with enforcement skills without social understanding have the potential to have difficulties in building relationships with the community.

The fifth factor is the social condition of the community. Communities in conflict areas cannot be understood as passive objects of security operations. They are part of an operating environment that has their own experiences, perceptions, interests, and security risks. Some people need state protection, but at the same time they can also experience fear due to the existence of armed groups and the intensity of security operations. Therefore, police operations must be able to carefully distinguish between civil society, support networks of armed groups, and groups of perpetrators of violence. Mistakes in reading social maps can weaken the legitimacy of the apparatus and strengthen the distance between the state and society.

"Task force activities such as security at the airport, patrols around the town, and security during major holidays really help us feel safe. But here in Nduga we are also afraid of being too close to the security forces, because later we could be marked by the indigenous community and considered to be an informant or spy for the security forces. So we need the security forces, but we also have to maintain our attitude within the community environment." (MS/SOC-TRUST, June 2, 2026)

The sixth factor is the role of local governments and local figures. Local governments, traditional leaders, religious leaders, and community leaders have an important position in building social communication, easing tensions, conveying security messages, and strengthening public trust. In the context of Community-Oriented Policing, partnerships between police and communities are an important element in solving security problems. However, such partnerships cannot be built instantly. Continuous

communication, respect for local social structures, and consistency of actions by the authorities are needed so that the public sees that security operations are not only oriented towards enforcement, but also protection.

Based on these factors, it can be affirmed that the obstacles in security operations in Nduga Regency cannot be partially understood. Terrain conditions are related to logistics. Communication limitations have to do with controlling operations. The command structure is related to coordination. The quality of personnel is related to adaptability. Community relations are related to legitimacy. The limitations of intelligence have to do with the quality of operational decisions. Therefore, adaptive policing models must be able to manage all of these factors in one framework that is planned, coordinated, intelligence-based, and oriented towards public trust.

3.3 Formulation of adaptive policing models in the context of asymmetric conflict

The results of the study show that the handling of KKB conflicts in Nduga Regency requires an adaptive policing model that is able to integrate enforcement, prevention, intelligence, technology, logistics, human resource strengthening, cross-sector coordination, and social partnerships. The model is necessary because the conflict in Nduga Regency is not only in the form of armed threats, but also moves in a complex social, geographical, political, and organizational environment. Therefore, the formulation of an adaptive policing model cannot only be built from the logic of enforcement, but must be formulated as an operating system that is able to adapt to changing situations, process information quickly, maintain social legitimacy, and evaluate the implementation of operations on an ongoing basis.

The adaptive policing model formulated in this study is referred to as the Integrated Adaptive Policing Model of the Pioneer Troop II Regiment. This model places security operations as a process that moves through the cycles of planning, executing, controlling, evaluating, and learning an organization. In this model, repressive, preventive, and intelligence approaches are not placed as intersubstitute options, but as complementary elements. As the escalation of threats increases, a repressive approach can be prioritized by remaining intelligence-based and the principle of proportionality. When the situation is relatively under control, preventive approaches are strengthened to build social communication and public trust. In all of these phases, intelligence serves as the basis for situational reading and decision-making.

The first component of this model is an escalation-based flexible response. Security responses should not be rigid, but should be tailored to the threat level, scene of the incident, community conditions, and available intelligence information. In high-threat situations, decisive action is needed to protect the authorities and the public. However, in situations where a social approach is possible, communication and prevention must be strengthened. This flexibility is at the heart of adaptive policing because operations in conflict areas cannot always be predicted in a linear manner.

The second component is the integration of preventive, repressive, and intelligence approaches. This integration means that any enforcement action must be based on accurate intelligence information and followed by preventive measures to reduce social

impact. On the contrary, preventive activities must be supported by intelligence mapping so that they are on target and not just a ceremonial activity. The integration also requires a clear coordination mechanism between the implementing units, intelligence elements, operational leaders, local governments, and local figures.

The third component is the strengthening of Human Intelligence. In a region like Nduga, technology cannot always replace the role of human information. Human Intelligence is needed to read social dynamics, obtain information from the field, understand intergroup relationships, and identify potential escalations. Strengthening Human Intelligence must be carried out through personnel debriefing, improving social communication skills, understanding local culture, and building networks with community leaders. Thus, intelligence is not only a technical function, but also part of the strategy of building trust and preventing conflict.

The fourth component is technology and logistics support. Adaptive policing requires better communication systems, adequate means of mobility, personnel equipment appropriate to the terrain, and data support that can help with decision-making. The technology can be used to strengthen area mapping, situation monitoring, operational communication, and information processing. However, technology must be understood as a support, not a substitute for social sensitivity and field understanding. Logistical support must also be designed based on the character of the region so that operations are not hampered by limited mobility and distribution.

The fifth component is adaptive human resources. Personnel serving in conflict areas need broader capabilities than just tactical capabilities. They must understand the law, human rights, social communication, conflict management, local culture, and the principle of proportionate use of force. From the perspective of Complex Adaptive Systems, organizations can only adapt if the actors in it have the ability to learn and adapt. Therefore, personnel debriefing must be directed to tactical capabilities as well as social capabilities.

The sixth component is cross-sector coordination. The KKB conflict in Nduga Regency cannot be resolved by the security forces alone. Local governments, traditional leaders, religious leaders, public service institutions, and the community need to be involved in a broader framework of handling. Cross-sectoral coordination is needed to ensure that security operations are inseparable from efforts to protect the community, social recovery, public services, and build trust. In this context, police operations should be placed as part of broader security governance.

"One of the techniques I use is to frequently gather cross-sectoral security forces in Nduga so that coordination is easier and the provision of information can be faster. Dynamics will always exist, problems will always exist, but my duty as a leader in Nduga is to maintain synergy, not only with the TNI, but also with the Regional Leadership Communication Forum (Forkopimda)." (PS/ORG-KOORD, June 4, 2026)

The seventh component is continuous evaluation. Every operation should result in organizational learning. The evaluation is not only carried out to assess the success of the action, but also to assess the social impact, quality of coordination, intelligence effectiveness, logistics adequacy, and changes in public perception. Continuous

evaluation allows organizations to improve strategies, adjust operating patterns, and avoid repeating mistakes. Thus, the adaptive policing model does not stop at the preparation of the design, but becomes a learning process that continues to move according to changes in the situation.

4. Conclusion

This research shows that the preventive, repressive, and intelligence approaches have been implemented in handling the KKB conflict in Nduga Regency during the 2018–2025 period, but their implementation is still running partially so that it has not yet formed an integrated operational system. The repressive approach has proven effective in responding to armed threats, but has the potential to reduce social legitimacy if not balanced with the strengthening of preventive and intelligence approaches. The effectiveness of the three approaches is influenced by various internal and external factors, including extreme geographical conditions, communication and logistical limitations, organizational capacity and quality of human resources, the effectiveness of the command structure, and support from the community, local government, and local figures. This finding confirms that handling asymmetric conflict requires adaptive, flexible operation management capable of continuously responding to changes in the situation.

Based on these findings, this research formulates an Integrated Adaptive Policing Model for Mobile Brigade Regiment II (*Resimen II Pasukan Pelopor*) that integrates threat escalation based response, synergy of preventive, repressive, and intelligence approaches, strengthening of human intelligence (HUMINT), technological and logistical support, development of adaptive human resources, cross-sector coordination, and continuous organizational evaluation. Theoretically, this research enriches the development of police science through the integration of Complex Adaptive Systems theory, Intelligence-Led Policing, Community-Oriented Policing, and the concept of POAC into an operation management framework for asymmetric conflict. Practically, the resulting model can serve as a reference for the Indonesian National Police (*Polri*), particularly the Mobile Brigade Corps (*Korps Brimob*), in formulating policies, strategies, and operational governance that are more adaptive, professional, and effective, while still maintaining social legitimacy and the protection of civilians in conflict areas.

This research has limitations because it uses a qualitative case study approach focused on Mobile Brigade Regiment II (*Resimen II Pasukan Pelopor*) in the context of the conflict in Nduga Regency, so the research results cannot yet be generalized to all characteristics of police operations in other conflict areas. In addition, this research relies more on interviews, document studies, and secondary data, so it has not yet measured the effectiveness of the model quantitatively or through long-term operational implementation. Therefore, future research is recommended to test the Integrated Adaptive Policing Model in various conflict areas with different characteristics, using mixed methods approaches or quantitative evaluation, and to examine the effectiveness of integrating technology, intelligence systems, and cross-institutional collaboration in improving the success of police operations in asymmetric conflict environments.

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